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Abstract
Manufacturers often sell their products both to customers acquired over time and sustained
through contractual agreements and to new businesses through electronic markets. These two sales
channels (contract markets and exchanged based sales and procurement) coexist for several capital-
intensive industries such as the semiconductor and chemical industries (Kleindorfer and Wu 2003).
The two sales channels can enable the manufacturer to better utilize the available capacity if the
manager can optimally allocate resources. In this paper, we establish an optimal production and
inventory allocation policy for a periodic-review, ﬁnite-horizon, capacity-constrained manufacturing
system. In particular, we show that a policy with two thresholds, produce-up-to and sell-down-
to/buy-up-to is optimal. We also provide some insights into the manufacturer’s dynamic pricing
policy for the long-term channel.
1 Introduction
Today, many commodity chip buyers meet their requirements through both long-term contracting
with the manufacturer and purchasing from a DRAM spot market. For example, Hewlett Packard
procures chips through long-term contracts and spot markets (Billington 2002). Contracts often cover
a preset planning horizon (such as 12 months). While these contracts provide price stability, they
often require the buyer to agree on a quantity ﬂexibility up front. On the other hand, the spot market
does not require either the chip buyer or the manufacturer to commit any quantity upfront. However,
this ﬂexibility comes at a risk due to volatile spot market value. Converge.com is one of several spot
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1markets available for trading memory chips. The copper industry is another example, in which a ﬁxed
price contract often governs the trade between the manufacturer and the buyer. Yet, buyers can also
procure from commodity exchanges such as the London metal exchange. Since the early 90’s several
spot exchanges have existed for commodity chemicals, plastics and metals, such as www.metalsite.com
(Glen and Weiner 1989).
In this paper, we study a capacity constrained manufacturer’s periodic review production and in-
ventory allocation problem. The manufacturer produces to satisfy uncertain demand received through
two diﬀerent channels. The ﬁrst channel constitutes long-term customer demand such as distributors
or wholesalers. The trade in this channel is based on contractual agreements. Examples of such agree-
ments are the price only contracts or the quantity discount contract structured for multiple periods.
The manufacturer may incur a penalty cost if he cannot deliver the orders requested through this ﬁrst
channel. Unmet orders can be lost or backlogged. Our analysis will address both scenarios. The sec-
ond channel is the spot market or an exchanged based business-to-business market. At the beginning
of each period, the manufacturer decides on the quantity to sell through the exchange. A clearance
mechanism, such as an auction, determines the value of products oﬀered on the spot market. The
ﬁnal value is determined at the end of each period. The manufacturer produces and sells his product
through these two channels concurrently. By deciding on the production quantity, the manufacturer
consumes also from the remaining capacity that is available through the planning horizon. His objec-
tive is to optimally decide how much to produce given available capacity and how to allocate inventory
across the two sales channels.
Contract markets and spot exchanges are inherently related. An increase in a product’s popularity
or a shortage would probably aﬀect both sales channels. For example, the 1999 earthquake in Taiwan
caused an immediate increase in global computer memory (DRAM) price. The spot price for DRAM
went up ﬁve times in one week and the contract price paid by major producers increased by 25% in the
same week (Papadakis and Ziemba 2002). When long-term buyers cannot satisfy their requirement
through contractual agreements, they may move to the spot market to supplement their contracted
orders, which can also shift the spot market value. To capture the non-stationarity of long-term
demand, the spot market value and the correlation between these two channels, we introduce the state
of the world modeled with a Markov process. This process governs both the distribution of long-term
demand and the spot market value.
We do not assume here a speciﬁc contract for the long-term market, and we do not specify an
auction mechanism for the spot market. We take these markets as given and characterize an optimal
production and inventory policy to maximize the manufacturer’s total proﬁt. In particular, we show
that a produce-up-to and sell-down-to/buy-up-to policy is optimal when the long-term proﬁt function
is concave and the spot market has a diminishing value to the quantity traded (i.e., increasing and
concave). At the beginning of each period, the manufacturer observes the state of the world, the
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triggers a production order to increase the net inventory to a level as close as possible to that period’s
produce-up-to threshold given available capacity. If after the production decision the net inventory
exceeds (resp., is below) the sell-down-to (resp., buy-up-to) threshold, then the policy requires the
manufacturer to allocate (resp., buy ) the diﬀerence between the threshold and the net inventory on
(resp., from) the spot market. Note that both produce-up-to and sell-down-to levels are functions of
the state of the world, which equilibrates the importance of both channels. For instance, if the spot
market is more attractive than the long-term channel, this may translate into a lower sell-down-to
level. We also show that when the spot market value is linear in the number of units traded, the
structure of the optimal policy could be simpliﬁed further. In that case, the production manager
produces such that the capacity level for the next period is consumed down to a threshold. This
threshold is state dependent only through the state of the world. To provide additional insights, we
also establish monotonicity results and show how policy parameters change with respect to the state of
the system. We also provide a numerical example to illustrate the optimal policy’s structure. Finally,
we characterize the manufacturer’s optimal pricing for the long-term sales channel and his optimal
total capacity prior to the start of the planning horizon. For this case, we restrict the mean of the
long-term demand to a linear function of the unit price. By comparing this setting to the one where
no spot market is available, we show, for example, that the existence of a spot market induces a higher
unit price. Hence, the long-term customer is worse oﬀ with a spot market.
2 Literature Review
The present paper focuses on the operational aspect of the problem, that is, on how to optimally
manage a periodic-review, capacity constrained manufacturing system that satisﬁes customers through
long-term channel (contract market) and the spot market over a ﬁnite horizon. Hence, the paper is
closely related to three streams of research: capacity constrained production or inventory control
problems, supply chain contracting and spot markets. Here, we focus on closely related papers and
refer the reader to others who provide comprehensive coverage on each of these topics.
The capacity constrained inventory control problem poses signiﬁcant challenges. For example,
when the manager incurs a positive ﬁxed cost for a production decision, no one knows what the
optimal policy is for this system. Researchers, however, have been able to partially characterize or
provide optimal production control policies for special cases and diﬀerent demand models (Shaoxiong
and Lambretch 1996, Gallego and Scheller-Wolf 2000, and ¨ Ozer and Wei 2004). On the other hand,
for a zero ﬁxed cost stationary production system, Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) show that a modiﬁed
base stock policy is optimal. We refer the reader to ¨ Ozer and Wei (2004) for a more comprehensive
coverage of capacity constrained production control problems.
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the expansion and contraction of capacity. Luss (1982) provides a comprehensive review of this topic.
Recently, Angelus and Porteus (2002) characterize an optimal policy for simultaneous capacity and
production management when the inventory is not carried from one period to the next. Bradley and
Glynn (2003) study a continuous version of a simultaneous capacity and inventory decision problem.
In the present paper, we take the total capacity over the entire horizon as given. However, we
assume that the manufacturer can decide how much of the available production capacity to use for
the current period and how much to reserve for future periods. These capacity dynamics are diﬀerent
from the classical literature, which assumes production capacity for each period to be known and
predetermined. In this sense, our capacity constrained production control problem has the ﬂavor of
the revenue management problem (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994 and Bitran and Mondschein 1997).
Many companies allocate a large fraction of their procurement budget to long-term contracts
(Billington 2002). Contract markets are an integral part of today’s supply chains. Among the most
commonly used contracts are ﬁxed price and quantity discounts contracts. A large group of researchers
study the interaction between two ﬁrms focusing on coordinating contracts, such as buyback contracts
(Pasternack 1985) and quantity ﬂexibility contracts (Tsay 1999). Cachon (2003) and Chen (2003)
provide an extensive survey of this literature. The diﬃculty of administering a portfolio of contracts
popularized the use of simple contracts whose impact on supply chain proﬁts is studied by others, such
as the price only contract in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), the quantity discount in Monahan (1984)
and advance purchase contract in ¨ Ozer and Wei (2002).
The third line of research is the extensive literature on spot markets and electronic business to
business exchanges. Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) provides a comprehensive review of this topic. The
research on spot markets addresses topics such as the viability of spot exchanges (Kaplan and Sawhney
2000), the existence of equilibrium (Mendelson and Tunca 2002), pricing mechanisms such as auctions
(Chen 2001), relationships between agents (Laﬀont and Tirole 1998), and ﬁnally operations decisions
(Seifert et al. 2002 or Araman et al 2002). In the latter works, the spot market is often considered as a
means to salvage left over inventory. In our setting, we provide a necessary assumption ensuring that
both long-term channel and spot market are equally important. We characterize an optimal policy
under both cases.
Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) point out that the integration of long-term markets and spot markets
for multi-period, state dependent demand analysis is an open question. In this paper, we address
exactly this problem and characterize an optimal policy for a manufacturer who sells through these
channels. We introduce a Markov process that governs the distribution of the long-term channel’s
demand as well as the spot market value. To the best of our knowledge, Song and Zipkin (1993) and
Sethi and Cheng (1997) are the ﬁrst to introduce a Markov modulated demand process into single
location inventory control problems and to characterize the optimality of state dependent base stock
4and (s,S) policies.
Relatively few papers address simultaneously contracting markets and spot markets in a multi-
period inventory control problem. Those who study this problem often establish eﬀective procurement
strategies for a buyer. For example, Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi (2003) study the problem
of a buyer who procures supplies through long-term contracts and a spot market. On the other hand,
we study the problem of a capacity constrained manufacturer who sells through these channels. Our
work complements Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi (2003). Kai and Lee (2003) also address
the manufacturer’s problem. They study the eﬀect of pricing and supply chain design strategies,
such as postponement, for a manufacturer who can sell customized products through Internet and a
traditional retail store. In contrast to this dual sales channel literature, there is an extensive literature
on production control policies for a manufacturer who can replenish from two distinct supply sources
(see for an example, Sethi, Yan and Zhang 2003). Finally, one paper similar in spirit to ours is
Caldentey and Wein (2004). In an inﬁnite horizon and a continuous time setting, the manufacturer,
who manages a single server queue under heavy-traﬃc, responds to both demand from the long-term
buyer and the spot market. The long-term demand is a deterministic ﬂuid, while the price of the spot
market follows a geometric regulated Brownian motion. Suboptimal but simple inventory policies are
obtained in this context.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In § 3, we present the model and our notation. In § 4,
we characterize an optimal production and inventory allocation policy. Furthermore, we consider the
special case of a linear spot market value function and discuss the behavior of the myopic policy. We
also provide additional structures to shed some light on the problem. In § 5, we provide insights on
the optimal long-term price-only contract and total capacity. In § 6, we provide a numerical example
to illustrate the optimal policy structure. In § 7, we conclude the paper.
3 Model Formulation
Consider a capacity constrained manufacturer who produces and sells through two channels over a
ﬁnite horizon. The manufacturer’s objective is to maximize his proﬁt by optimally deciding on (i)
how much to produce given limited production capacity and (ii) how to allocate the ﬁnished products
between two sales channels. Through the ﬁrst channel, the manufacturer sells the product to his
long-term buyers. During each period t, the manufacturer faces a non-negative random demand dt,
the probability density function of which is fdt. Through the second channel, the spot market, the
manufacturer sells his product to spontaneous buyers. A clearance mechanism determines the spot
market value, which is the manufacturer’s proﬁt (cost) from selling on (buying from) the spot market.
An exogenous random variable ωt, the state of the world, governs the system. In particular, this
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models the non-stationarity of the long-term demand, the spot market value, and the correlation
between these two channels. This variable evolves based on a discrete time Markov chain and takes
values in the ﬁnite set S = {1,...,S}. We denote by A its S × S transition matrix. In other words,
both the spot market value and the long-term demand are Markov modulated processes generated by
the same Markov chain.
On the production side, the manufacturer relies on a subcontractor. At the beginning of the
planning horizon t = 0, the subcontractor and the manufacturer agree on the total quantity Q that
the manufacturer can consume. The manufacturer pays in advance the cost of reserving and producing
Q units. At the beginning of each period t, the manufacturer decides on the capacity to use from the
remaining available capacity Qt.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of period t ∈ {0,1,...,T}, the manufacturer
observes the amount of on-hand inventory It, the total backorder Bt, and the state of the world wt.
When backordering is not allowed we set Bt ≡ 0. He decides on (i) the production quantity qt and (ii)
the allocation of inventory between the two channels. After production completion, the manufacturer
assigns st units on the spot market, while the remaining inventory faces the long-term demand. Next,
the long-term customer demand dt and the spot market value function are simultaneously realized.
Demand is satisﬁed through on hand inventory, otherwise it is either backlogged or lost. The manager
receives the payment from the long-term channel and the spot market transaction and he incurs
holding and shortage costs based on the end-of-period net inventory.
At the beginning of period t, let
xt : be the net inventory before the production and spot market transactions
= It − Bt,
zt : be the net inventory after the production and spot market decisions
= xt + qt − st. (1)
We refer to zt as the modiﬁed net inventory.
The state of the system is given by (xt,Qt,wt). After observing dt, the distribution of which
depends on wt, the manufacturer meets the long-term demand from modiﬁed net inventory zt. At
the end of period t, he updates net inventory by xt+1 = g(zt − dt). If demand is lost, the update is
g(zt −dt) = [zt −dt]+, where [x]+ = max{0,x} and [x]− = max{0,−x}. If full backlogging is allowed,
the update is g(zt−dt) = zt−dt. In general, we assume that g is sublinear (i.e. g(x+y) ≤ g(x)+g(y)
for all (x,y) on the real line), so that g(0) = 0, g is non-decreasing, concave and |g0(x)| ≤ 1. In
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xt+1 = g(zt − dt), (2)
Qt+1 = Qt − qt, (3)
P(wt+1 = j|wt = i) = Pi(wt+1 = j) = Aij, (4)
for t ∈ {0,1,...,T − 1} and i,j ∈ S.
The following are the constraints on the production quantity and on the quantity sold in the spot
market.
(
0 ≤ qt ≤ Qt,
st ≤ [xt + qt]+.
(5)
The ﬁrst is the production capacity constraint. The manufacturer can produce at most Qt units at each
period t. The second constraint is to ensure that the manufacturer can sell in the spot market only when
he has positive on-hand inventory. Note also that this second constraint can be equivalently replaced
with −[xt +qt]− ≤ zt. Once the production decision is made, the manufacturer allocates his inventory
between the spot market and the long-term channel. Hence, deciding on the quantity st to sell on the
spot market is equivalent to deciding on the net inventory that faces the long-term demand, that is zt.
The spot market decision can be interpreted as an inventory allocation decision among sales channels.
We refer to this constraint set by Y (x,Q)
∆ = {(qt,zt) ∈ R2, such that qt ∈ [0,Q] and−[x+qt]− ≤ zt}.
Next, we deﬁne the manufacturer’s expected total proﬁt at the beginning of each period. His
proﬁt has two components: the proﬁt from spot market transactions and the proﬁt from the long-term
channel.
The proﬁt from the spot market Πt depends on the state of the world wt ∈ S and the number of
units st the manufacturer trades. We assume the following condition.
A1. For all wt ∈ S and t ∈ {0,1,...,T}, the spot market value function Πt(·,wt) is increasing and
concave in the number of units st ∈ R traded on the spot market such that Πt(0,wt) ≡ 0.
The concavity on the positive line of the spot market value function models economies of scale from a
buyer perspective, which is expected from a spot market relying on a clearance mechanism. Intuitively,
concavity means that every additional unit put in the market has a diminishing return for the buyers.
Works related to spot markets, in which the exchange occurs as a result of a clearance mechanism,
usually assume that the ﬁnal unit price is linear in the amount traded (Mendelson and Tunca 2003).
Spot markets are often run by auctions. Maskin and Riley (1989) show that total price paid to acquire
units through an eﬃcient auction mechanism is concave in the quantity sold for valuations following
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to a convex payment function for the manufacturer. This assumption relates to the manufacturer
experiencing an increasing marginal cost for every additional unit bought from the spot market. Such
behavior is typical for instance in a capacity constrained spot market. Furthermore, the concavity on
the negative line assumption is also consistent with our model where the manufacturer’s main activity
is selling; while buying from the spot market (comparable to a subcontracting activity) is left as a
means to hedge against a high penalty cost from the long-term contract.
The expected proﬁt from the long-term channel Γt depends on the state of the world wt ∈ S and
the modiﬁed net inventory zt. We assume the following condition.
A2. For all wt ∈ S and t ∈ {0,...,T}, the expected single-period proﬁt from the long-term channel
Γt(·,wt) is twice diﬀerentiable in the modiﬁed net inventory zt, concave and coercive1 such that
∂zΓt(0,wt) ≥ 0.
This assumption is satisﬁed, for example, when the manufacturer charges a wholesale price pt > 0 for
each unit sold through the long-term channel and incurs a penalty cost bt per unit of unmet demand,
and a holding cost ht per unit of on-hand inventory at the end of the period. In this example, when
loss of sales is assumed, the expected proﬁt from the long-term channel is
Γt(zt,wt) = Et{pt min{dt,zt} − ht[zt − dt]+ − bt[dt − zt]+}. (6)
When backlogging is allowed, the expected proﬁt function is given by
Γt(zt,wt) = Et{ptdt − ht[zt − dt]+ − bt[dt − zt]+}. (7)
Payment is made at the time of the order. In both cases the expectation is taken with respect to
long-term demand dt whose distribution depends on the realization of the state of the world wt.
Notice that the wholesale prices are pre-speciﬁed at the beginning of the planning horizon. A
particular setting is the case where the manufacturer and his long-term buyers agree on a ﬁxed whole-
sale price p per unit sold during the entire planning horizon. Assumption A2 is also satisﬁed when
the manufacturer provides quantity discounts. In this case, we replace the unit price pt with sum of
concave price functions whose arguments are the number of units purchased by long-term buyers. In
the last section, we discuss the case where the price pt is also a control variable and the manufacturer
dynamically chooses the prices along with the initial net inventory and the starting capacity.
We conclude this section with a condition on the spot market and the long-term contract marginal
proﬁts at point zero.
1We call a function g : R → R coercive if lim|x|→∞ g(x) = −∞
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t(0,wt) ≤ Γ0
t(0,wt).
In the lost sales case described earlier, A3 translates into Π0
t(0,wt) ≤ bt+pt. Condition A3 basically
links both channels and creates a balance between them. Indeed, it implies that the long-term contract
is more proﬁtable than the spot market when small quantities are traded. On the other hand, recall
that the spot market value function is increasing in the quantity traded while the long-term contract
is coercive and eventually decreasing to −∞. We will show later in Theorem 1 that this condition
results in short-selling being naturally eliminated, or equivalently that the second constraint in (5) is
redundant.
At the beginning of any period t, the manufacturer’s total expected proﬁt is given by Γt(zt,wt) +
Π(st,wt).
In the proofs, we drop the state of the world wt and the time t from proﬁt functions or variables
when this omission does not cause any confusion. We denote the partial derivatives ∂2F
∂xi∂xj either by
∂xi,xjF or ∂i,jF, where F(x1,x2,..xn) is a function of n variables. The choice will be clear from the
context. Finally, when F is said to be increasing (decreasing) we mean weakly increasing (decreasing),
and when concave, we mean the function is jointly concave in all its arguments.
4 An Optimal Production and Inventory Allocation Policy
Next, we study the problem in which the total production capacity Q, the spot market value function
Πt, and the long-term proﬁt function Γt are given.
4.1 An Optimal Policy
At every period t, the manufacturer decides how much to produce and how much to sell on the
spot market. The dynamics are given by equations (2), (3) and (4). Given the state of the system
(xt,Qt,wt), total proﬁt function at time t, with T −t periods remaining to termination, is determined
by the following recursive equation
Jt(xt,Qt,wt) = max
(qt,zt)∈Y (xt,Qt)
Vt(qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) where, (8)
Vt(qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) = Γt(zt,wt) + Πt(xt + qt − zt,wt) + EJt+1(xt+1,Qt+1,ωt+1)
and JT+1(xT+1,·,·) ≡ K(xT+1) and K(·) is a concave terminal proﬁt function.
We will prove through Theorem 1 and under assumption A3 that the second constraint in Equa-
tion (5) is always satisﬁed. Hence, the set of constraints would be replaced by Y (xt,Qt) = [0,Qt]×R.
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entire real line. This results in Qt+1 taking eventually negative values. For this reason, we let
Y (xt,Qt) = {Qt} × R, when Qt < 0. We refer to ¯ J as the function deﬁned by the maximization
problem in (8) without any constraint on (qt,zt). We use the notation “ ¯ ” to refer to the vari-
ables that correspond to this unconstrained optimization problem. We sometimes refer to the term
EJt+1(xt+1,Qt+1,ωt+1) by R(zt,Qt − qt,ωt) where R is a real function from R2 × S . Next, we char-
acterize the optimal production and inventory allocation policy. We start by stating two lemmas that
simplify the presentation of the main result.
Lemma 1 Consider a function J : R2 → R, increasing in both variables and concave. Let g : R → R
also be an increasing concave function, and d be a random variable with a ﬁnite mean. Then, (z,u) 7→
EdJ(g(z − d),u) is also increasing and jointly concave in z and u.
Proof. The increasing property is clearly maintained through composition. We will provide a
proof for the concavity conclusion. Consider, (u,z) and (u0,z0) ∈ R2 and θ ∈ (0,1). We write
θJ(g(z − d),u) + (1 − θ)J(g(z0 − d),u0) ≤ J(θg(z − d) + (1 − θ)g(z0 − d),θu + (1 − θ)u0)
≤ J(g(θ(z − d) + (1 − θ)(z0 − d)),θu + (1 − θ)u0)
= J(g(θz + (1 − θ)z0 − d),θu + (1 − θ)u0).
The ﬁrst inequality is due to the concavity of J. The second one is the result of both the concavity of
g and the monotonicity of J. Under mild assumptions (see page 481 of Durrett), we can interchange
expected values and derivatives and thus the results are preserved under expectation.
Lemma 2 Based on (8), we drop t and wt and get
J(x,Q) = max
(q,z)∈Y (x,Q)
V (q,z,x,Q), where
V (q,z,x,Q) = Γ(z) + Π(x + q − z) + R(z,Q − q).
(i) If the functions Γ, Π and R are concave and Y has a convex graph2, then V and J are also
concave.
(ii) If Γ and Π are strictly concave and Y (x,Q) is as deﬁned above for all x and Q, then V is strictly
concave in (q,z,x) and (q,z,Q) if and only if R is strictly concave in its second variable. In this
case, the function J is strictly concave as well but separately in x and Q.
2Y is said to have a convex graph if for all Z ∈ Y (X), Z
0 ∈ Y (X
0), and α ∈ [0,1], we have αZ + (1 − α)Z
0 ∈
Y (αX + (1 − α)X
0)
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of how the variables interact in this multidimensional problem. To simplify exposition, we suppress
the points at which the functions are evaluated.
H =

 
 


Π00 + ∂2,2R −Π00 − ∂1,2R Π00 −∂2,2R
−Π00 − ∂1,2R Γ00 + Π00 + ∂1,1R −Π00 ∂1,2R
Π00 −Π00 Π00 0
−∂2,2R ∂1,2R 0 ∂2,2R

 
 


.
In order to obtain the formulation of H, we use ∂qR(z,Q − q) = −∂QR(z,Q − q) = −∂2R and
∂zΠ(x + q − z) = −∂qΠ(x + q − z) = −∂xΠ(x + q − z) = −Π0.
Next, we show that H is negative semi-deﬁnite; that is, xTHx ≤ 0 for all vectors x or equivalently
all the eigenvalues of H are non-positive. Now notice that the ﬁrst column (respectively, row) is a linear
combination of the third and the fourth columns (respectively, rows). Applying a Gauss elimination
on H we obtain
H0 =
"
0 0
0 ¯ H0
#
where,
¯ H0 =

 

Γ00 + Π00 + ∂1,1R −Π00 ∂1,2R
−Π00 Π00 0
∂1,2R 0 ∂2,2R

 
.
Note that H and H0 have the same eigenvalues. Hence, it suﬃces to show that sub-matrix ¯ H0 is
negative semi-deﬁnite. We apply another Gauss elimination by replacing the second column (resp.
row) of ¯ H0 with the sum of the ﬁrst and the second column (resp. row), and changing the order of the
variables. We obtain the following matrix
¯ H00 =




Π00 0 0
0 Γ00 + ∂1,1R ∂1,2R
0 ∂1,2R ∂2,2R




The result follows because all the functions are concave, that is, all the second derivatives are non-
positive and the determinant of the Hessian of R is non-negative, ∂2,2R · ∂1,1R − (∂1,2R)2 ≥ 0. By
taking the maximum of V when (q,z) belong to the convex graph Y (x,Q), we get a concave function
in (x,Q) (see page 227, Theorem A4, of Porteus 2002). Hence, J is concave in (x,Q).
To prove part (ii), we consider V ﬁrst as a function of (q,z,Q). By carrying out a similar Gauss
elimination as before, we transform the Hessian of V into ¯ H00. If Π and Γ are strictly concave, then
strict concavity of V is guaranteed by the strict concavity of R only with respect to its second variable.
We can observe these results by computing the determinant of ¯ H00,
det ¯ H00 = Γ00Π00∂2,2R + Π00(∂1,1R · ∂2,2R − (∂1,2R)2).
11With regard to the strict concavity of J, recall here that Y = [0,Q] × R. If q belongs to the interior
of the set Y , then the strict concavity of J is maintained through maximization (the proof follows
exactly the same steps of Theorem A4, of Porteus 2002). Otherwise, either q = 0, or q = Q. In both
cases, the function V is strictly concave in (z,Q), so that J is concave in Q. Similar proof holds for
the strict concavity with respect to x.
Now we are ready to state the main result which fully characterizes an optimal policy.
Theorem 1 The following holds for any state of the world wt under A1, A2, and A3:
(i) Jt is increasing in xt and Qt,
(ii) Jt is concave in (xt,Qt) and strictly and separately concave in xt and Qt,
(iii) Vt is concave in (qt,zt,xt,Qt) and strictly concave in (qt,zt,Qt) and (qt,zt,xt),
(iv) An optimal policy is deﬁned by a state dependent (¯ qt, ¯ zt)-policy, where the produce-up-to ¯ qt and
sell-down/buy-up-to ¯ zt thresholds are the solution to the following system of equations
(
∂qVt(qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) = 0,
∂zVt(qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) = 0.
(9)
Under this policy, optimal production and inventory allocation are given by
(q∗
t, z∗
t) =

  
  
(0, ¯ zt(0)) if ¯ qt ≤ 0
(¯ qt, ¯ zt) if ¯ qt ∈ (0,Qt)
(Qt, ¯ zt(Qt)) if ¯ qt ≥ Q
(10)
where ¯ zt(q) is a solution to ∂zVt(q,zt|xt,Qt,wt) = 0.
Proof. The proof is based on an induction argument. The result for part (i) trivially holds for
t = T + 1. Assume that it holds for t + 1, and let Q1
t < Q2
t,
Vt(qt,zt|xt,Q1
t,wt) = Γt(zt,wt) + Πt(xt + qt − zt,wt) + EJt+1(g(zt − dt),Q1
t − qt,wt+1)
≤ Γt(zt,wt) + Πt(xt + qt − zt,wt) + EJt+1(g(zt,dt),Q2
t − qt,wt+1)
= Vt(qt,zt|xt,Q2
t,wt).
By taking the maximum on both sides and noticing that [0,Q1
t] ⊂ [0,Q2
t], we conclude that Jt is
increasing in Qt. A similar induction argument shows that Jt is also increasing in xt.
Before we start the proof for remaining parts we observe the following. Consider the function Vt
as a function of zt. We compute its ﬁrst derivative and evaluate it at the point −[xt + qt]− ≤ 0. We
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∂zVt(qt,−[xt + qt]−|xt,Qt,wt)
= Γ0(−[xt + qt]−,wt) − Π0(xt + qt + [xt + qt]−,wt)
+ g0(−[xt + qt]− − dt)E∂xJt+1(g(−[xt + qt]− − dt),Qt − qt,wt+1)
≥ Γ0(0,wt) − Π0(0,wt) + g0(0)E∂xJt+1(0,Qt − qt,wt+1)
≥ 0.
The ﬁrst inequality is due to the concavity of all functions. The last inequality is due to A3 and the
fact that J and g are increasing functions (by (i) and the deﬁnition of g). Based on this observation we
conclude that ¯ zt ≥ −[xt + ¯ qt]−. Hence, we conclude that argmax(q,z)∈[0,Q]×RVt(q,z|xt,Qt) ∈ Y (x,Q)
and hence the second constraint in (5) is always satisﬁed. In the remaining we redeﬁne Y (x,Q) =
[0,Q] × R. To initiate the induction argument for Part (ii), note that JT+1(x,QT+1) = K(x) is
concave in (x,QT+1) and strictly concave in x. To initiate the induction argument for the strict
concavity in Qt consider the last period, in which all the remaining capacity will be produced, so
that JT(xT,QT) = maxzT∈Y (xT,QT) ΓT(zT) + ΠT(xT + QT − zT) + EK(g(zT − dT)). The inside of the
maximum is concave in (zT,QT) and strictly concave in QT. So, part (ii) is satisﬁed for t = T + 1
or t = T. Next, we deﬁne RT(z,QT − qT) ≡ EJT+1(g(z − dT),QT+1). Lemma 1 implies that RT
is concave. The functions ΠT and ΓT are also both concave. Hence, Lemma 2 implies Part (ii)
and (iii) for t = T. Now assume for an induction argument that Part (ii) is true for t + 1, that is
Jt+1(x,Qt+1) is concave in (x,Qt+1) and strictly and separately concave in both arguments. From
Lemma 1, Rt(z,Qt − qt) ≡ EJt+1(g(z − dt),Qt+1) is concave. Hence Lemma 2 implies that Part (ii)
and (iii) are true for t, concluding the induction argument. Finally, Part (iv) is a result of Part (iii),
and the strict concavity of Vt in (qt,zt). We write
Jt(xt,Qt) = max
q∈[0,Qt]
max
z Vt(q,z|xt,Qt),
and note that the the inside maximum in the previous equation is a concave function of q. Hence,
q∗
t = argmaxq∈[0,Qt] maxz Vt(q,z|xt,Qt) is the closest to ¯ qt (unconstrained maximizer) in [0,Qt]. If
¯ qt ∈ (0,Qt), then clearly (q∗
t,z∗
t) are the solutions of (9). Otherwise, ¯ qt ∈ {0,Qt} and ¯ zt(q) is the
corresponding maximizer of Vt(q,z|xt,Qt) when q is respectively 0 or Qt. This completes the proof.
The ﬁrst part of the previous theorem is intuitive. The optimal proﬁt Jt increases with Qt. Larger
capacity yields larger proﬁts. Increasing capacity is equivalent to a relaxation in our problem because
the manufacturer can always sell inventory on the spot market. Similarly, the proﬁt increases with the
initial net inventory. The manufacturer can always sell the additional units on the spot market based
on the spot market price Πt(·,ωt) without incurring any additional holding cost. Hence, by the end of
the planning horizon the manufacturer will always produce the remainder of his initially capacity Q.
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that both the optimal production quantity and the modiﬁed net inventory are functions of the state
of the system (xt,Qt,ωt). Therefore, the policy is clearly state dependent. If the state of the system
is such that ¯ qt(xt,Qt,ωt) ≤ 0, then the manufacturer produces nothing. Otherwise, he produces
min{¯ qt,Qt} units; the manufacturer produces up to ¯ qt given available production capacity Qt.
In each of the previous cases, the manufacturer brings the net inventory after production to the level
¯ zt. In particular, if the amount of inventory after production is lower than ¯ zt, then the manufacturer
is better oﬀ buying up-to ¯ zt from the spot market. If the amount of inventory after production is
higher than ¯ zt, then the manufacturer is better oﬀ selling on the spot market down-to the threshold
¯ zt. Note that the target level ¯ zt depends both on the long-term channel expected proﬁt Γt and on the
spot market value function Πt in current and future periods. Hence, the optimal policy captures the
speculative behavior of delaying production when the manufacturer expects to observe a high future
spot market value.
The policy partitions the state space into three easily identiﬁable regions. Each region provides
a recipe for production and inventory allocation targets. The policy is state dependent through the
state of the world wt and also the state space xt and Qt. By taking a closer look at the objective
function, however, we show that the policy parameters have a simpler structure. Note that we can
rewrite the objective function as
V (qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) = Γt(zt,wt)+Πt(xt+Qt − (Qt − qt)−zt,wt)+R(zt,Qt − qt,wt),
= ˜ V (Qt − qt,zt|xt + Qt,wt). (11)
Now it is easy to see that Qt − ¯ qt and ¯ zt are only functions of the total units available in the supply
chain i.e. xt + Qt, along with the state of the world wt. The quantity Qt − ¯ qt is a policy parameter
that we can denote by ¯ Qt+1. It is the capacity level remaining for period t + 1 that the manufacturer
is targeting by producing ¯ qt in period t. What matters is the total units xt + Qt owned by the
manufacturer. The production cost is incurred at the start of the horizon and hence units can, in the
unconstrained problem, move freely between post- and pre-production sites.
The previous observation, has an important impact on the computations of the policy parameters
and the value function. It enables a state space reduction with regard to the values of the policy
parameters. The value function itself was not altered, but one can start computing ¯ Jt (which is one
dimension lower), and then conclude on the value of Jt by checking if the optimal value is an interior
point or not.
Proposition 1 The unconstrained proﬁt function ¯ Jt and the policy parameters, Qt − ¯ qt and ¯ zt are
only functions of xt + Qt.
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net inventory level xt and the remaining capacity Qt are economic substitutes, that is, when the net
inventory increases, the manufacturer needs less capacity and vice-versa.
We recall that based on the concavity of the function V , if ¯ zt and ¯ qt are ﬁnite, then they deﬁne the
unique solution of the system given by (9). In the next Theorem, we show that both values must be
ﬁnite under the assumptions stated earlier, which is not necessarily obvious in this multidimensional
setting.
Theorem 2 Under A1 with strict concavity, A2 and A3, the solutions to the system of Equations (9)
are ﬁnite; speciﬁcally
¯ zt ≤ z0
t < ∞ for t ∈ {0,1,...,T} while |¯ qt| < ∞ for t ∈ {0,1,...,T − 1},
where z0
t is the unique maximizer of Γt.
Proof. We ﬁrst show the following relation.
If, x + Q ≤ x0 + Q0 and x ≥ x0, then J(x,Q) ≤ J(x0,Q0). (12)
Consider, (x,Q) and (x0,Q0) as in Equation (12). We necessarily have Q0 ≥ Q. Let z∗ and q∗
be such that J(x,Q) = Γ(z∗) + Π(x + q∗ − z∗) + R(z∗,Q − q∗). In particular, 0 ≤ q∗ ≤ Q. We
deﬁne q0 = x + q∗ − x0 so that 0 ≤ q0 ≤ x + Q − x0 ≤ Q0 and Q0 − q0 ≥ Q − q∗. We observe that
(z∗,q0) ∈ Y (x0,Q0), and conclude that
J(x0,Q0) ≥ Γ(z∗) + Π(x0 + q0 − z∗) + R(z∗,Q − q0) ≥ J(x,Q).
Now consider any z ≥ z0
t and q, by coerciveness of Γt there exists a z0 ≤ z0
t such that Γt(z) = Γt(z0).
Let q0 = q −z +z0 ≤ q. By sublinearity of g we have that g(z −d)+Q−q ≤ g(z0 −d)+z −z0 +Q−q
and we can conclude that
Γ(z) + Π(x + q − z) + EJ(g(z − d),Q − q) ≤ Γ(z0) + Π(x + q0 − z0) + EJ(g(z0 − d),Q − q0).
This concludes the proof for the ﬁrst part of the Theorem. To prove the second part, ﬁrst notice that
¯ qT = ∞. However, for any t < T we have already proved that ¯ zt is ﬁnite, hence, if ¯ qt is inﬁnite it
implies that the number of units sold on the spot market is inﬁnite. Recall from the deﬁnition of
Y (xt,Qt), that qt = Qt when Qt ≤ 0. Hence, if ¯ qt > Qt, then ¯ qt+1 = Qt − qt. Therefore, for a certain
zt+1 ≤ z0
t+1, we have
limsup
qt→∞
[Πt(xt + qt − zt) + R(zt,Qt − q)]
≤ Γt(z0
t+1) + limsup
qt→∞
[Πt(xt + qt − zt) + E{Πt+1(xt+1 + Qt − qt − zt+1) + R(zt+1,0)}].
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lim
qt→∞Π(xt + qt − zt) + Π(xt+1 + Qt − qt − zt+1) = −∞.
To see this equality, note that for u ≥ 1 the strict concavity property translates into
Π(u) + Π(−u) < u · Π0(1) + Π(1) − u · Π0(0) = u · (Π0(1) − Π0(0)) + Π(1).
Hence, ¯ Vt(zt, qt = ∞|xt,Qt) = −∞. A similar reasoning holds if qt = −∞. This constitutes proof
that ¯ Vt is coercive in qt for t < T.
The ﬁrst part of the previous result shows that the inventory threshold, ¯ zt is upper bounded by
the myopic inventory threshold when the spot market is not available to the seller, z0
t. More generally,
one expects that the inventory threshold is lower in the dual channel case than selling only through
the long-term channel case. In other words, the presence of a spot market results in a decrease in
the level of inventory and by the same token in a decrease in the holding costs. Intuitively, the spot
market is a source of an additional demand. Hence, by being able to sell on the spot market, the
capacity constrained manufacturer needs to devote less to the long-term contract.
4.2 Linear Spot Market Case
We replace assumption A1 with
A1’. The spot market value function is linear on the real line, Πt(u,wt) ≡ πt(wt) · u, for all wt ∈ S
and t ∈ {0,...,T}.
Under this new assumption, the spot market has a constant unit price πt, that is revealed at the end
of each period. As we mentioned above, a strict concave spot market value function translates into a
decreasing marginal gain and thus restrains the manufacturer from trading a high amount of units on
the spot market (¯ qt < ∞). When the spot market value function is considered linear in the number of
units traded, ¯ qt could be inﬁnite and one might want to add a constraint Ct on the number of units
that can be bought from the spot market. The set of constraints Y (xt,Qt) should then be adjusted
accordingly, but remains a convex graph. Clearly, such linear spot market value function satisﬁes
A1, and hence Theorem 1 still holds. For the remaining, and without loss of generality, we assume
Ct = ∞. The next proposition provides additional structure on the optimal policy when the random
spot market value function is linear.
Proposition 2 Under the same conditions of Theorem 1, replacing A1 with A1’, we obtain the fol-
lowing
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(ii) the policy parameters Qt − ¯ qt and ¯ zt are independent of xt and Qt and are only functions of the
state of the world wt.
Proof. The proof is straightforward when considering A1’ and Equation (11)
We refer to ¯ Qt+1 = Qt− ¯ qt as the consume-down-to level. Under this policy, the manufacturer will
review the state of the world wt and if he produces, he will produce up to ¯ qt such that the remaining
capacity for the next period is consumed down to ¯ Qt+1. Recall from Proposition 1 that this quantity
is independent of the state (xt,Qt), while the production parameter ¯ qt is independent of xt and linear
in Qt. Similarly, the inventory facing the long-term demand follows an order-to policy independent of
the state of the system (except again through the state of the universe). Intuitively, the constant proﬁt
margin of the spot market makes the spot market less relevant from an optimization point of view.
The objective is essentially to manage the long-term channel with respect to the remaining inventory
units and capacity; the spot market is used as a secondary sales channel.
These observations lead us to conclude that when the spot market is considered to be as important
as the long-term channel, the spot market value should not be modeled as a linear function of the
quantity traded. However, in the case where the spot market is indeed considered as a salvage channel
(secondary market) the linear framework seems adequate. The manufacturer can employ such simple
policies to his advantage. Next, we discuss myopic policies.
4.3 A Myopic Policy
To obtain additional insights, we study myopic policies that maximize current period’s proﬁt without
consideration of future ones. These types of sub-optimal solutions are attractive because they are
simple and can be good approximations for optimal policies. In fact, we show below that a myopic
policy is asymptotically optimal in initially reserved capacity per period, that is Q/T.
In a myopic approach, the maximization problem reduces to
ˆ Jt(xt,Qt,wt) = max
(zt,qt)∈Y (xt,qt)
[Γt(zt,wt) + Πt(xt + qt − zt,wt)]. (13)
From assumptions A1 and A2, we conclude that z 7→ Γt(z,wt)+Πt(xt +qt −z,wt) is concave and
coercive. Hence, this function admits a unique maximizer zm
t . It is easy to observe that this function
is also increasing in qt: the manufacturer will myopically choose to produce all the capacity Q at
once, in the ﬁrst period. A probably better and more realistic myopic policy is one that assumes a
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level is then the solution to the following equation,
Γ0
t(z,wt) = Π0
t(xt + qm − z,wt). (14)
Consider the problem in which the spot market value function is strictly concave and the proﬁt
margin tends to zero as more products are sold through the spot market. In such an environment,
we show that the myopic policy is asymptotically optimal when both the initial capacity and long-
term horizon become large but where Q/T → ∞; (this includes the case where T is constant and
the capacity gets large). We let J0(x,Q,T,w) and Jm
0 (x,Q,T,w) denote the value functions at time
0, when adopting the optimal and the myopic policy, respectively. We also denote by r the discount
factor, crucial as we let T go to inﬁnity.
Theorem 3 Assume that supt{Πt(∞)} < ∞. Then,
lim
Q/T→∞
J0(x,Q,T,w)/Jm
0 (x,Q,T,w) = 1,
where Πt(∞)
D = lims→∞ Πt(s)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that Πt(∞) is independent of t. Let ε > 0, and
consider the following speciﬁc myopic policy which relies on a constant production Q/T per period
and a modiﬁed net inventory zt = zm
t ≤ z0
t, where z0
t is the maximizer of Γt and zm
t is the solution
to the myopic problem given by (13). From Equation (14), we have that zm
t → z0
t, as Q/T → ∞.
Furthremore, the amount traded on the spot market, given by st = xt+Q/T −zt, increases to inﬁnity
with Q/T. We now let the periodic production Q/T be large enough so that the probability that at
all times zt ≥ z0
t −ε and Πt(st) > Π(∞)−ε is bigger than 1−ε. Conditioning on this event, we write
(1 − ε)(
Z T
t=0
exp(−rt)Γt(z0
t − ε)+
Z T
0
exp(−rt)(Π(∞) − ε))
≤ Jm
0 (x,Q,T) ≤ J0(x,Q,T)
≤
Z T
0
exp(−rt)Γt(z0
t) +
Z T
0
exp(−rt)Π(∞).
The proﬁt function based on the myopic policy described earlier is clearly bounded by the optimal
myopic proﬁt function, which in turn is bounded by the optimal value function J0. For the last
inequality note that the right hand side is an absolute upper bound on the proﬁts of both channels.
Now we let ε go to zero which completes the proof.
As the amount produced per period, that is Q/T, goes to inﬁnity, we make it more likely to have
positive on-hand inventory at any period. If at each period there are enough units to achieve any
policy, then the proﬁts realized during each period can be decoupled and a myopic policy becomes
optimal.
184.4 Monotonicity Results
We recall that the general policy parameters described earlier are state dependent. They are simpliﬁed
in the linear spot market case. To get a better general sense of the policy parameters, we devote the
rest of this section to analyzing their behavior and the resulting optimal actions; that is, how z∗, q∗,
¯ z and ¯ q change as functions of state variables. Based on the setting we are in, (i.e. a two-dimension
control problem), we will make use of a particular version of the Implicit Function Theorem which we
begin with below.
Lemma 3 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let T be a function from R3 into R2, such that for all
(x,y,z) ∈ R3,T(x,y,z) = (∂xf(x,y,z),∂yf(x,y,z)), where f is a real valued function twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable such that ∂x,xf(x,y,z)∂y,yf(x,y,z) − ∂x,yf2(x,y,z) 6= 0.
Assume that ∃ (¯ x0, ¯ y0,z0) ∈ R3 such that T(¯ x0, ¯ y0,z0) = (0,0). Then there exists a continuous and
diﬀerentiable function φ : R → R2, such that T(φ(z),z) = (0,0) for all z and its gradient is given by:
¯ x0(z) =
∂y,zf∂x,yf − ∂x,zf∂y,yf
∂y,yf∂x,xf − ∂x,yf2
and
¯ y0(z) = −
∂y,zf∂x,xf − ∂x,zf∂x,yf
∂y,yf∂x,xf − ∂x,yf2
where, ¯ x and ¯ y are the components of φ (i.e. φ(z) = (¯ x(z), ¯ y(z)).
Proof. The existence, uniqueness and diﬀerentiability of the function φ follows from the general
statement of the Implicit Function Theorem (see for instance page 138 of Cheney 2001). Concerning
the speciﬁc formulation of the gradient of φ, recall that T(φ(·),·) is identically zero for all z and thus
the derivative with respect to z of each component is zero:
∂
∂z
∂xf(¯ x, ¯ y,z) = ¯ x0(z)∂x,xf + ¯ y0(z)∂x,yf + ∂x,zf = 0
and,
∂
∂z
∂yf(¯ x, ¯ y,z) = ¯ x0(z)∂x,yf + ¯ y0(z)∂y,yf + ∂y,zf = 0.
Solving these two equations gives us the result.
Theorem 4 Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, we have
(i) 0 < ∂x(¯ zt − ¯ qt) ≤ 1, 0 < ∂Q(¯ qt − ¯ zt) ≤ 1, ∂x¯ zt = ∂Q¯ zt and 1 + ∂x¯ qt = ∂Q¯ qt. In particular,
xt + ¯ qt − ¯ zt and Qt − ¯ qt + ¯ zt are increasing in xt and Qt.
19(ii) ∂x ¯ Jt(xt,Qt,wt) = Π0(xt + ¯ qt − ¯ zt,wt) = ∂Q ¯ Jt(xt,Qt,wt) = E∂2 ¯ Jt+1(g(zt − dt),Qt − ¯ qt,wt+1) ≥ 0
and ∂x,Q ¯ Jt(xt,Qt,wt) ≤ 0.
Proof. For part (i), we apply Lemma 3 where f is taken equal to V considered as a function
of three variables q, z and Q. We write for all w and t, V (q,z,Q|x,w) = Γ(z,w) + Π(x + q −
z,w) + R(z,Q − q,w), where R is jointly concave and x is ﬁxed. Deﬁne ¯ z(Q) and ¯ q(Q) such that
∂qV (¯ q, ¯ z,Q|x,w) = ∂zV (¯ q, ¯ z,Q|x,w) = 0. Applying Theorem 3 we get,
∂Q¯ q =
∂2,2R(Γ00 + Π00 + ∂1,1R) − (Π00 + ∂1,2R)∂1,2R
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2
=
∂2,2RΓ00 + Π00(∂2,2R − ∂1,2R) + ∂2,2R∂1,1R − (∂1,2R)2
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2 . (15)
Similarly, we write
∂Q¯ z =
−∂2,2R(−Π00 − ∂1,2R) − ∂1,2R(Π00 + ∂2,2R)
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2
=
Π00(∂2,2R − ∂1,2R)
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2. (16)
By taking the diﬀerence, we obtain
∂Q(¯ z − ¯ q) = −
∂2,2RΓ00 + (∂2,2R∂1,1R − (∂1,2R)2)
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2 . (17)
Note that the function V is strictly concave, which results in the denominator of Equation (17) being
strictly positive. The numerator is non-positive again by the concavity of the functions involved. A
similar proof shows that ¯ zt − ¯ qt is increasing in xt. For that consider V function of (q,z,x). Applying
again Lemma 3 we can write
∂x¯ q = −
Π00(Γ00 + ∂1,1R − ∂1,2R)
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2 , and ∂x¯ z =
Π00(∂2,2R − ∂1,2R)
∂2,2V ∂1,1V − ∂1,2V 2.
We conclude by taking the diﬀerence of the previous expressions, and noticing that (1,1)TR(1,1) =
∂1,1R+∂2,2R−2∂1,2R ≤ 0 by concavity of R. We develop the denominator in Equation (17) which is
equal to
Γ00Π00 + Γ00∂2,2R + Π00(∂2,2R + ∂1,1R − 2∂1,2R) + (∂1,1R∂2,2R − (∂1,2R)2).
By the concavity of the functions involved all the terms of the denominator are non-negative. Now
consider the numerator of Equation (17) and notice that it is smaller than or equal to the denominator.
This shows the upper bound, ∂Q(¯ z − ¯ q) ≤ 1. In a similar way we prove that ∂x(¯ z − ¯ q) ≤ 1.
For part (ii), we write ¯ J(x,Q,w) = V (¯ z, ¯ q|x,Q,w) and take ﬁrst the derivative with respect to x. We
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∂x ¯ J(x,Q,w) = ∂x¯ z Γ0(¯ z,w) + (1 + ∂x¯ q − ∂x¯ z)Π0(x + ¯ q − ¯ z,w)
+ ∂x¯ z ∂1R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w) − ∂x¯ q ∂2R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w)
= ∂x¯ z ∂zV (¯ z, ¯ q|x,Q,w) + ∂x¯ q ∂qV (¯ z, ¯ q|x,Q,w) + Π0(x + ¯ q − ¯ z)
= Π0(x + ¯ q − ¯ z,w).
The last equality is due to ∂¯ zV (¯ z, ¯ q,Q|x,w) = ∂¯ qV (¯ z, ¯ q,Q|x,w) = 0. Recall also, that ¯ J is only a
function of the sum xt + Qt and hence ∂x ¯ J = ∂Q ¯ J. In a similar way we have
∂Q ¯ J(x,Q,w) = ∂Q¯ zΓ0(¯ z,w) + (∂Q¯ q − ∂Q¯ z)Π0(x + ¯ q − ¯ z,w)
+ ∂Q¯ z∂1R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w) + (1 − ∂Q¯ q)∂2R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w)
= ∂Q¯ z∂zV (¯ z, ¯ q|x,Q,w) + ∂Q¯ q∂qV (¯ z, ¯ q|x,Q,w) + ∂2R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w)
= ∂2R(¯ z,Q − ¯ q,w).
Taking now the derivative with respect to x and Q, based on our previous computations we obtain
∂x,Q ¯ J(x,Q,w) = ∂Q(¯ q − ¯ z)Π00(x + ¯ q − ¯ z,w). (18)
By recalling (i) and A1, we complete the proof.
Note that xt+¯ qt−¯ zt relates to the amount sold on the spot market. Through part (i) of the previous
Theorem, we know that this quantity is increasing in both xt and Qt. The quantity Qt−¯ qt+¯ zt behaves
exactly as Qt − ¯ qt + ¯ zt −dt. When backlogging is allowed, the latter quantity relates to the total units
remaining in the system at the end of the period, ¯ xt+1+ ¯ Qt+1. The monotonicity of these two quantities
means not only that if more units are available either through xt or Qt, then more units will be sold
on the spot market, but also that more units will be kept for the next period.
We now deﬁne the following quantities. Let q∗
t(xt,Qt|zt,wt) ≡ argmax0≤qt≤Qt V (qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) be
the optimal production quantity when the modiﬁed net inventory is given in advance. Let z∗
t(xt,Qt|qt,wt) ≡
argmax−[xt+qt]−≤zt Vt(qt,zt|xt,Qt,wt) be the optimal modiﬁed net inventory when the production
quantity for each period is determined in advance, (e.g., qt ≡ Q/T for all t ≤ T, which can also be
imposed by the manufacturer’s supplier). We similarly deﬁne the corresponding policy parameters
¯ qt(xt,Qt|zt,wt) and ¯ zt(xt,Qt|qt,wt). Next, we state some monotonicity results for the production and
the inventory allocation policy.
Theorem 5 Under the conditions of Theorem 1 the following holds.
(i) For a given production quantity qt, the optimal modiﬁed net inventory, z∗
t(xt,Qt|qt,wt), is in-
creasing in xt and decreasing in Qt.
21(ii) For a given modiﬁed net inventory zt, the optimal production quantity, q∗
t(xt,Qt|zt,wt) is de-
creasing in xt and increasing in Qt.
(iii) For a given state (xt,Qt), the optimal modiﬁed net inventory, z∗
t(qt|xt,Qt,wt), is increasing in
qt. Similarly, the optimal production quantity, q∗
t(zt|xt,Qt,wt) is increasing in zt.
(iv) Similar results hold for ¯ qt(xt,Qt|zt,wt) and ¯ zt(xt,Qt|qt,wt).
Proof. We deﬁne Rt(zt,Qt − qt,wt) ≡ EwtJt+1(xt+1,Qt+1,wt+1). Note that R(·,·,wt) is a function
of two variables jointly concave as a result of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. We ﬁrst show the result for
¯ z and ¯ q and we argue at the end that it indeed holds for z∗ and q∗. For Part (i), note that Part (ii)
of Theorem 1 allows us to write ¯ z as the unique solution to the following equation
Γ0(z) + ∂1R(z,Q − q) = Π0(x + q − z,w). (19)
Hence, we can conclude that ¯ z is increasing in x by noticing that the LHS of Equation (19) is decreasing
in z and independent of x, while the RHS is increasing in z and decreasing in x. Next, we apply a
similar proof to show that ¯ z as a function Q is weakly decreasing. From Theorem 4 (ii), we have that
∂1,2R(z,Q − q) ≤ 0 and thus the LHS is decreasing in Q, while the RHS is constant. Part (ii) can be
shown exactly the same way. For part (iii), we ﬁx the state of the system (x,Q,w), and identify ﬁrst
how the optimal inventory level, z∗(q|x,Q,w) behaves as the production quantity changes (note that
q is not necessarily the optimal production value). We apply the basic version of the Implicit function
Theorem (see Bertsekas 1985) with V considered as a function of z and q when ﬁxing x and Q. Recall
that ∂zV (q, ¯ z|x,Q,w) = 0, hence, the existence of a diﬀerentiable function of q, ¯ z(·|x,Q,w), such that
∂q¯ z(q|x,Q,w) = −
∂1,2V
∂1,1V
=
Π00 + ∂1,2R
Γ00 + Π00 + ∂1,1R
≥ 0. (20)
A similar argument holds for ∂z¯ q(z|x,Q,w). In order to conclude the result for z∗ and q∗, recall the
system of equations given by (10). Observe that all the possibilities of z∗ and q∗ in part (i), (ii) and
(iii) behave similarly respectively to ¯ z and ¯ q.
This theorem suggests that the optimal capacity and the initial inventory are economic substitutes:
as one increases, less is needed from the other. However, the optimal modiﬁed net inventory and the
remaining available capacity are not economic substitutes.
Theorem 6 At each period t, the amount sold on the spot market s∗
t, is increasing in xt and Qt.
Proof. The case where ¯ qt is an interior point is dealt with through Theorem 4. We consider here
the other cases. If q∗ = 0, s∗
t = xt − ¯ zt . The quantity ¯ zt is by deﬁnition the solution to the equation
Γ0(¯ z) + Π0(xt − ¯ zt) + ∂1R(¯ zt,Qt) = 0. We take the derivative with respect ﬁrst to xt and obtain that
0 ≤ ¯ z0
t(xt) =
Π00(xt − ¯ zt)
Γ00(¯ zt) + Π00(xt − ¯ zt) + ∂1,1R(¯ zt,Q)
< 1.
22Taking the derivative with respect to Qt, we obtain
¯ z0
t(Qt) = −
∂1,2R(zt,Qt)
Γ00(¯ zt) + Π00(xt − ¯ zt) + ∂1,1R(¯ zt,Q)
≤ 0.
We can conclude that s∗
t is increasing in xt and Qt. We carry out a similar analysis when q∗ = Q.
The last Theorem shows that more units available on hand leads to more units sold on the spot
market. It is not clear that such a result holds as well for the q∗ and z∗.
5 Long-term Channel Pricing Policy
Thus far we have taken the long-term channel proﬁt function and total capacity as given. We then
characterized the manufacturer’s optimal production and inventory allocation policy. Here, we propose
to determine the optimal long-term contract parameters and the total capacity Q. In particular, we
assume the long-term proﬁt function Γt to be governed by a parameter pt at every period t. For
the sake of clarity, we consider the parameter pt as the unit price that the manufacturer decides and
reveals at the beginning of each period to his long-term channel. This scenario includes the setting
where the wholesale price is constant and the manufacturer decides on a constant unit price p, for the
entire horizon. In the general case, the setting enables the manufacturer to dynamically decide on the
long-term price, the quantity to produce, and how to allocate the inventory every period. Note that
the manufacturer can inﬂuence long-term demand by deciding on the price. We model this relationship
with a multiplicative model and a linear mean-demand-price curve. Let wt ∈ S be the state of the
world. We deﬁne
µp(wt) = αwtpt + βwt, (21)
as the mean of demand from the long-term channel where αwt and βwt are two real numbers with
αwt ≤ 0. Demand for the long-term channel is given by µp(wt)d1(wt), where d1 is a random variable
with mean 1 and a density function f(·,wt) deﬁned on the positive line. We observe that the non-
negativity of the mean demand enforces the following constraint on pt,
0 ≤ pt ≤ pmax
∆ = min
wt
βwt/|αwt|. (22)
We assume that A2 still holds when we consider Γt as a function of (zt,pt,wt). In order to observe
whether this assumption is still meaningful, we consider the lost sales and backlog cases discussed
earlier and given in Equations (6) and (7). We show that the single period long-term proﬁt function
Γt is indeed concave.
Proposition 3 Under the setting described above the single period proﬁt from the long-term channel,
Γt, given by either equations (6) and (7) is concave in (zt,pt).
23Proof. We will consider once more the Hessian of the function involved, namely Γ. Recall that
Γ(z,p) = pµp − h
Z z/µp
0
(z − µp u)f(u)du − b
Z ∞
z/µp
(µp u − z)f(u)du.
The ﬁrst derivatives of the function Γ with respect to p and to z are
∂zΓ(z,p,w) = b
Z ∞
z/µp
f(x)dx − h
Z z/µp
0
f(x)dx
and,
∂pΓ(z,p,w) = 2αwp + βw − b
Z ∞
z/µp
αwxf(x)dx + h
Z z/µp
0
αwxf(x)dx.
Hence,
∂z,zΓ(z,p,w) = −1/µpf(z/µp)(b + h) < 0
while,
∂2
pΓ(z,p,w) = 2αw− b
αwz
(αwp + β)2
αwz
αwp + β
f(z/µp)− h
αwz
(αwp + β)2
αwz
αwp + β
f(z/µp)
= 2αw −
z2α2
w
µ3
p
f(z/µp)(b + h) < 0.
Finally,
∂z,zΓ(z,p,w)∂p,pΓ(z,p,w) − (∂z,pΓ(z,p,w))2 = −2αw/µpf(z/µp)(b + h) > 0.
A similar proof holds for the lost sales case.
The main result of this section is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Under the same conditions as in Theorem 1 while considering Γt function of z and p,
we have that parts (i) and (iv) of Theorem 1 hold in this case as well. Furthermore, (ii) and (iii) are
replaced with
(ii) Jt is jointly concave in (xt,Qt,pt), strictly concave in (xt,pt) and (Qt,pt),
(iii) Vt is concave in (qt,zt,xt,Qt,pt).
Proof. The proof of this Theorem follows the same steps of Theorem 1. The latter relied mainly
on Lemma 2. Therefore, we start by proving an equivalent result to Lemma 2 by considering p as an
additional variable. We show the concavity of Γ+Π+R, when Γ and R are also functions of p. Note
that without loss of generality, we can combine the functions Γ + R into one function that we denote
24by R. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we compute the Hessian of the function of interest. We denote it
by
Hp =

 
 
 


−∂2,3R
∂1,3R
H 0
∂2,3R
−∂2,3R ∂1,3R 0 ∂2,3R ∂3,3R

 
 
 


.
The matrix H is the one deﬁned in Lemma 2. By applying a Gauss elimination, we convert Hp into
¯ Hp.
¯ Hp =

 
 
 


0 0 0 0 0
0 ∂1,3R
0 ¯ H0 0
0 ∂2,3R
0 ∂1,3R 0 ∂2,3R ∂3,3R

 
 
 


.
We let again ¯ H0
p be the 4 × 4 non-zero sub-matrix of ¯ Hp. Again, using a Gauss elimination, we can
easily convert ¯ H0
p into
"
Π00 0
0 R
#
,
where R is the Hessian of the function R. From its Hessian, we conclude that the function Vt is
concave (resp., strictly concave) if and only if R is concave (resp., strictly concave). The rest of the
proof is exactly the same as the one for Theorem 1.
Consider, for instance, the setting where the manufacturer decides before the start of the horizon on
setting a ﬁxed price p0 for the long-term unit demand and reserving a total capacity Q. The previous
Theorem shows that there exists a unique way of doing so, and the optimal price and capacity are
given by solving the system of equations when the initial inventory x = 0,
(
∂pJ0(0,Q,p) = 0
∂QJ0(0,Q,p) = 0.
(23)
If we let ¯ p, ¯ Q, the respective solutions of those equations take the value inﬁnity when no solution
exists, then the optimal long-term price and capacity are given respectively by p∗ = min{¯ p,pmax}
and Q∗ = min{ ¯ Q,Qmax}, where Qmax is the maximum capacity the supplier can allocate to the
manufacturer and pmax is deﬁned in Equation (22).
Although a ﬁxed price contract is quite common in manufacturing, in some industries (such as
airlines, hotel and more recently retail) dynamic pricing policies are often used. As we saw for the
previous Theorem, the problem becomes less tractable with three control variables (q,z,p). However,
25convinced of the importance of dynamic pricing, we obtain with little eﬀort additional results that
depict some of the main characteristics of the optimal pricing strategy.
We start by studying some monotonicity results related to the price pt. First, we show that ¯ zt
decreases with the value of the price pt. The intuition true in the myopic case, where by increasing
the price the demand decreases and hence less inventory is needed, is therefore true as well in the
dynamic setting.
Proposition 4 The optimal sell-down-to/buy-up-to level ¯ zt is decreasing with the unit long-term price
pt.
Proof. To show this, it is enough to prove that ∂p,zV ≤ 0 (see Topkis (1978)). Recalling that ¯ q,
being the optimal capacity level, is a solution to Π0(x+q −z)−∂2R(z,Q−q,p) = 0. We consider the
expression
∂p,zV (¯ q,z,p|x,Q)
= ∂z,pΓ(z,p) + ∂z[¯ q0(p)(Π0(x + q − z) − ∂2R(z,Q − q,p)) + ∂3R(z,Q − q,p)]
= −α∂z,zΓ(z,p) − α∂z,zR(z,Q − q,p)
≤ 0.
The last equality is obtained by observing (see proof of Proposition 3) that ∂pΓ(z,p) = 2αp + β −
α∂zΓ(z,p). Similarly, we have ∂pEJ(z−d,Q−q) = ∂p
R ∞
0 J(z−µpu)f(u)du = −α∂zEJ(z−d,Q−q).
The ﬁnal inequality is due to the concavity of the functions involved.
Other monotonicity results can be obtained for the price pt. For instance, in the linear spot market
case, it is easy to show again that ¯ pt is independent of x and Q as well. One interesting question is to
study the monotonicity of ¯ pt as a function of Qt. The traditional revenue management theory predicts
that the price is decreasing with the total capacity (Bitran and Mondshein (1997) or Gallego and van
Ryzin (1994)). In our context, the quantity is connected with ¯ zt, which is not clearly monotonic in the
capacity Qt, as we discussed in the previous section. In order to facilitate the analysis, we consider
the same problem but where the modiﬁed net inventory ¯ zt = St is ﬁxed and pre-determined. This
case is plausible, for example, when the manufacturer has committed a ﬁxed pre-speciﬁed quantity to
face the long-term demand every period. We show the following result.
Proposition 5 Under the setting described above, the optimal dynamic price ¯ pt is decreasing in the
total capacity Qt available at time t.
Proof. To prove this result, we show that ∂p,QV (¯ q,p|S,x,Q) ≤ 0 for a given S. Taking the derivative
of V with respect to p and then Q as in the previous proof leads to −α(1 − ¯ q0(Q))∂1,2R(S,Q − q,p).
From Theorem 4, we conclude that 1 − ¯ q0(Q) ≥ 0 and so ∂p,QV (¯ q,p|S,x,Q) ≤ 0
26We end this section by considering the myopic policy. We follow the same steps as in Proposition 3,
to show that in the dynamic pricing context a myopic policy is still asymptotically optimal with
¯ pm
t = argmaxp maxz Γt(z,p,wt). In particular, in a stationary environment (i.e. Γt is independent of
t) ¯ pm
t ≡ pm is then independent of t.
Proposition 6 In a stationary environment a constant price is asymptotically optimal as the initial
capacity Q increases.
Finally, in the myopic setting we study how the presence of the spot market aﬀects the price the
manufacturer oﬀers to the long-term demand. We show that as the spot market channel becomes
more proﬁtable the manufacturer tends to increase the price on the long-term customer. Indeed, to
obtain a bigger share from the spot market demand, the manufacturer needs to devote a bigger part
of his capacity to the spot market. Hence, less inventory is devoted to the long-term channel; in order
to minimize the impact of the penalty cost, the manufacturer needs to decrease the long-term demand
rate. He does so by increasing the unit price pt.
To study this problem, we parameterize the spot market value by a multiplicative scalar , so
that the value obtained from selling u units is Π(u). Note that for  = 0, the spot market is not
an available option. We also assume a price only contract where the manufacturer oﬀers a ﬁxed unit
price pt ≡ p for every unit sold to the long-term demand.
Proposition 7 Under a myopic policy, the long-term unit price p is increasing with .
Proof. For clarity, we assume a linear spot market function, although the same proof holds true for
any concave spot market value function. To obtain the optimal price p and the policy parameter ¯ z,
the manufacturer solves both equations concurrently: ∂pΓ(z,p) = 0 and ∂zΓ(z,p) − π = 0. We have
that
∂pΓ(z,p,w) = 2αwp + βw − b
Z ∞
z/µp
αwxf(x)dx + h
Z z/µp
0
αwxf(x)dx
so that
z/µp = G−1

2p + βw/αw − b
b + h

(24)
and G(z) =
R z
0 uf(u)du is increasing in z. Basically, the price z/µp decreases with p. On the other
hand, ∂zΓ(z,p) = b − (b + h)F(z/µp) = π,
or equivalently
z/µp = F−1

b − π
b + h

. (25)
We conclude that the ratio z/µp decreases with  while it is decreasing in p. This completes the proof.
27From Equation (25) note also that the order-down-to level z decreases as the spot market becomes
more proﬁtable ( increases). If  is large enough, one will shift completely to the spot market.
6 A Numerical Example
The purpose of this section is to illustrate numerically the optimal policy structure. We use a backward
induction algorithm to solve the functional Equation (8). The long term channel proﬁt function is
assumed stationary over the planning horizon, and is as given in Equation (7). Backlogging is allowed.
We set the parameters to p = 10, h = 2, b = 18, T = 6. The market is governed by three states of the
world: “High”, “Medium” and “Low”. The state transition matrix is
A2 =

 

3
4
1
5
1
20
1
10
4
5
1
10
1
20
1
5
3
4




In all world states, long term demand is normally distributed with a standard deviation, σ, of 1. The
expected demand µ in a given period is determined by the state of the world. We use µ = 20, 10, and 5
for high, medium and low demand states, respectively. Demand is truncated to ensure positive values.
We consider a logarithmic spot market value function, that is Π(st,wt) = kwplog(1+st), where kw is
one for low demand, four for medium demand, and eight for high demand.
Figure 1 depicts the proﬁt function J1 under medium demand. Notice that optimal proﬁt is
increasing and strictly and separately concave in x1 and Q1 (Theorem 1). Figure 2 illustrates the
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Figure 1: Optimal Proﬁt J1
optimum production quantity q∗
t for three values of xt. For each instance, when suﬃcient capacity is
28available, a produce-up-to threshold is sought; otherwise, producing all remaining capacity is optimal
(Theorem 1). In cases where we have ample remaining capacity, we also produce units destined for
the spot market. Figure 2 illustrates the optimum modiﬁed net inventory z∗
t for three values of xt.
Consider for example x1 = 10 and Q1 = 40. From these graphs, it is optimal to produce q∗
1 = 12
units and bring net inventory to 32 units; and sell 11 units in the spot market to bring the modiﬁed
net inventory down to z∗
1 = 21 units. Note also that the sell-down-to level (21) matches the expected
demand for the present state (20) and a small margin of safety stock (1).
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Figure 2: Production quantity q∗
1 (left) and modiﬁed net inventory z∗
1 (right)
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a capacity constrained manufacturer who sells to a long-term channel and
trades with a spot market over a ﬁnite horizon. We established optimal policies to maximize the
system’s proﬁt in a general case when proﬁt value functions (from the long-term channel and the spot
market) are concave. In the special case of a linear spot market the policy is state independent. In
general, following such a policy, the manufacturer optimally produces from total capacity available
and decides on how to allocate inventory between the contract market and spot market. Production
managers and decision makers are often interested in understanding qualitatively how they should
respond to changes in the environment of the problem. The structural results in this paper provide
ways for developing insights as well as tools for designing eﬃcient algorithms for large scale settings.
For example, we show that the number of units sold on the spot market increases with both net
inventory and remaining capacity available. We also show that myopic policies can deﬁne very good
approximations when the expected capacity per period (Q/T) is large. The model also provides a
framework to quantify the performance of a capacity constrained production system with respect to,
for example, capacity and long-term pricing policy in the presence of a spot market. From a dynamic
pricing perspective, our study conﬁrms results obtained in the literature under simpler settings. For
instance, we show that the price is monotone with the total capacity and that a constant price is
29asymptotically optimal when the total capacity becomes large. Finally, we observe that the presence
of a spot market induces the manufacturer to increase the long-term channel unit price, making the
long-term customer worse-oﬀ.
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